Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Yale Medicine Thesis Digital Library

School of Medicine

9-30-2010

Uncompensated Care provided by Physicians at an
Academic Medical Center during 2007-2008 using
an Opportunity Cost Model
Simon Laganiere

Follow this and additional works at: http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/ymtdl
Recommended Citation
Laganiere, Simon, "Uncompensated Care provided by Physicians at an Academic Medical Center during 2007-2008 using an
Opportunity Cost Model" (2010). Yale Medicine Thesis Digital Library. 177.
http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/ymtdl/177

This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Medicine at EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly
Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale Medicine Thesis Digital Library by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital
Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

Value of Uncompensated Care provided by
Physicians at an Academic Medical Center
in 2007-2008 using an Opportunity Cost
Model

A thesis submitted to the
Yale University School of Medicine
In partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Medicine

By
Simon Erik Laganiere
2010

Page |2
VALUE OF UNCOMPENSATED CARE PROVIDED BY PHYSICIANS AT AN
ACADEMIC MEDICAL CENTER IN 2007-2008 USING AN OPPORTUNITY COST
MODEL
Simon E Laganiere (Sponsored by David Leffell, MD) Department of Dermatology, Yale
University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT

This project was aimed at defining, quantifying and analyzing the value of
uncompensated care provided by physicians as part of the Yale Medical Group for the
2008 fiscal year. Using an opportunity cost model, uncompensated care was calculated
for each department as a total of bad debt and free care and then compared to existing
estimates of such care. Another aim of this study was to conduct an interdepartmental
comparison of the value of such care as a percentage of departmental earnings. To
undertake this study, a literature search was performed to determine previous estimates
and models of uncompensated care by physicians. Primary financial data (including
charges, payments and write-offs for Bad Debt and Free Care) from the Yale Medical
Group for fiscal year 2008 was then collected, fed into the opportunity cost model and
compared to published estimates. The results of this study showed that, as a whole,
physicians at the Yale Medical Group provided $6,510,373.65 of Uncompensated Care (or
2.75% of Total Payments) with a departmental range of 0.57%-15.29% of Total
payments. These results show that Faculty physicians at Yale provided a larger amount
of Uncompensated care than the published estimates obtained from random sampling of
almost 4000 physicians. The results also reveal large differences in levels of
uncompensated care between departments at Yale.
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Introduction
Definition of the Academic medical center (AMC)/ Academic Health Center
(AHC)
Academic medical centers, by virtue of complex and evolving organization structures,
are historically somewhat difficult to define and as Blumenthal et al. state in their report for the
Commonwealth Fund: “definitions of an academic health center vary” 1. In their attempts to
characterize and trend the changes in AMCs over time, the Commonwealth Task Force used the
following working assumption: “AHCs consist of allopathic U.S. medical schools and their closely
affiliated or owned educational and clinical institutions. In many cases, AHCs also include other
health professional schools (public health, nursing, pharmacy, dentistry, allied health
professions)”1. Another definition used in the Journal Academic Medicine defines the AHC as:
“the formal and informal interrelationships between a medical school's clinical practice,
educational programs, research activities, and associated teaching hospitals” 2.

The exact interplay of financial and legal responsibilities and liabilities that govern the
AMC’s organizational framework are beyond the scope of this introduction but it is important to
note that the many different models exert a set of incentives and pressures on each institution.
That being said, there are a set of commonalities to AMCs that, in effect, create environments
that respond to external forces in similar ways.

In fact, as stated in the Journal of Academic Medicine in 2008: “The organizational
structures of academic health centers (AHCs) vary widely, but they all exist along a continuum of
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integration-that is, the degree to which the academic and clinical missions operate under a
single administrative and governance structure.”2 In The Academic Health Center: Evolving
Organizational Models, Wartman states that “AHCs generally fall somewhere between two
extremes. At one extreme is a model of full organizational integration where the collective
components of the AHC are led by a single CEO and a common overarching governing board. At
the other extreme is a more loosely affiliated model in which the university academic activities,
medical school physician practices, and teaching hospital operations are each managed by
different leaders and governed by distinct and independent boards.”2

History of AMC
A distinct unifying feature of these large integrated medical centers is that they have a
“combination of missions that include medical education and training, basic and applied
research on new medical practices and technologies, and the delivery of state-of-the-art and
technologically advanced patient care. For many AHCs, their mission also includes the provision
of care to the poor and uninsured.”1 The requirement to fulfill many simultaneous goals with
limited resources sets up a tension between these varied missions. And as AHCs evolve and
respond to external pressures, one should, in fact, expect a requisite change in the approach to
each historic mission.

Mechanisms of Support

Blumenthal et al. describe the financial support mechanism of AHCs as follows: “In the
past, society has relied on a complex mixture of public and private mechanisms to support the
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mission-related expenses of AHCs. Public support has taken the form of explicit payments to
fund biomedical research (from the National Institutes of Health and other sources), some
educational expenses (from direct graduate medical education payments under Medicare and
federal and state grants to support primary care and other training), and some indigent care
costs (from the Medicaid disproportionate share hospital program, local subsidies, and
Medicare). Other governmental support has taken the form of add-ons to Medicare and
Medicaid payments (from indirect medical education at federal and state levels and the
Medicare disproportionate share hospital program). Private support has for the most part taken
the form of the higher prices charged private payers by AHCs; it sometimes takes the form of
charitable contributions to AHCs from individuals or private foundations.”1

As competition for limited resources increases, it would seem perhaps obvious that the
most fragile or expendable AHC-related mission is the provision of care to the medically
indigent. Since it constitutes a financial burden that is often cross-subsidized by funds generated
by other mission-related activities (clinical and research endeavors), caring for the poor at AHCs
is continuously in jeopardy. In fact, The Commonwealth Task Force states that “As we begin the
new millennium, the mission of charity care is facing formidable challenges. Health care
competition is reducing hospital revenues, threatening the availability of the cross-subsidies that
support hospitals’ social missions, including indigent care”3. However, as the following will
demonstrate, this specific mission has served not only a vital historic role but remains of great
importance to the current provision of care to the un- and underinsured.
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Short History of Healthcare for the Medically Indigent

“The mission of providing care to the poor goes back over 200 years to the
establishment of the first teaching hospitals and medical schools in America. In 1769, Dr. Samuel
Bard gave the commencement speech to the first graduating class of Kings College Medical
School in New York City. Urging the establishment of a hospital, Dr. Bard laid out what he
believed should be the missions of this new organization—patient care, research, and teaching.
In describing the patient care mission, he said, “Let those who are at once the Victims, both of
Poverty and Disease, claim your particular attention.”3As Blumenthal et al recount: “Rich and
middle class patients were treated in their homes. Hospitals were to be avoided. Only the poor
were left to be treated in institutions, and to provide the raw material for medical education
and research. Hospitals were “charitable institutions, funded and maintained through gifts,
donations, and fund-raising.” 3

During the twentieth century, “both the role of hospitals and the financing of care went
through major changes. Improvements in technology brought both middle and upper class
patients into hospitals. Hospitals were no longer sources of care of last resort. The emergence of
the health insurance industry revolutionized the financing of these institutions and the financing
of care provided to the poor.”3 Specifically, “the 1965 legislation that established the Medicare
and Medicaid programs provided the opportunity for faculty to bill federal and state
governments for their professional services to the elderly and the poor.” 4 No longer solely
dependent on charitable giving, “AHCs and other hospitals began financing charity care through
cross-subsidies from paying patients. Local governments used tax revenues to provide additional
support to public hospitals”4.
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Historically, charity care to the poor served another important function in that poor
patients provided educational opportunities for the training of medical students. “Many medical
schools formed loose affiliations with clinical faculty to meet the educational needs of both
students and trainees, often through the provision of unreimbursed care to the poor and elderly
in their associated hospitals. Until the mid-1960s, the faculty’s patient care services for these
populations went unreimbursed.”4 As medical training and the medical insurance industry have
evolved, however, this important historic agreement has not continued to play as significant a
role. Combined with increasing financial pressures, the lack of direct tradeoff has further
jeopardized the fulfillment of this important function.

Current changes and evolution with new pressures
In the Sept 6th 2000 article in JAMA entitled “Academic Medicine’s Financial
Accountability and Responsibility, Reinhardt describes the evolution of AMC-related missions.
He states: “Indeed, it can be argued that the leaders of academic medicine continue to be
victims of an utterly confused US public that simply cannot decide what the social role of health
care should be in this country. From academic medicine, that confused public now demands the
impossible, namely, that academic medicine pursue its traditional, altruistic mission of providing
cutting-edge patient care, performing world-class basic and clinical research, and educating the
physicians of the future after having been thrust into a harsh, price-competitive marketplace.
Academic medicine is expected to play nicely in an environment where nice folks finish last” 5.
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In fact, multiple marketplace pressures have come to bear on AMCs simultaneously. In
the Academic Medicine article The Evolving Organizational Structure of Academic Health
Centers: The Case of the University of Florida, Barrett describes them as the following1:

1. Decreases in states' general revenues to public medical schools,
2. Flattening of the National Institutes of Health budget supporting research at medical
schools,
3. Reductions in reimbursement for physicians' clinical services
4. Growth in #of underinsured/uninsured

(To this list we could also add):
5. Disproportionate increase in AMC burden

The last three of these factors merit closer attention and support for these claims is presented
in the following subsections.

Reductions in reimbursement for academic physician’s clinical services

In the August 2006 Academic Medicine article The Impact of the Lack of Health
Insurance: How Should Academic Medical Centers and Medical Schools Respond?, Coleman
states that “Faculty in clinical departments typically face very high practice costs and are
reimbursed for clinical services by insurers whose rates have not kept pace with inflation in the
cost of health care. He states that “the margins of clinical practice in medical schools and AMCs
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are increasingly unable to cross-subsidize the care of uninsured patients from the care of
insured patients. Consequently, individual faculty and clinical departments are under increasing
pressure to limit care of uninsured patients” 6.

The drop in Medicare payments to FPPs (Faculty-Practice Plans) is due to a combination
of concomitant issues. “First, beginning in 1991, Medicare implemented the resource-based
relative value scale (RBRVS) for the physician work component of physician payments. This new
reimbursement policy resulted in major drops in Medicare payment rates for physician
specialists. As AHCs tend to have a relatively high density of specialists to support their specialty
care and educational missions, FPPs faced a decrease in Medicare payments”3. Medicare has
also “implemented new rules restricting the circumstances under which teaching physicians may
bill for services. Thus, while AHC hospitals providing disproportionate amounts of care to the
poor continue to receive additional support from Medicare and Medicaid, the revenues of FPPs
from the public plans have been falling”.3

Growth in #of underinsured/uninsured

As financial pressures mount and supply of possible charity care decreases, the
concomitant increase in the amount of medically-indigent patients and thus the demand for
charity services is increasing. According to the Kaiser Family Foundation report on the uninsured
in America in 2004, “there are nearly 44 million Americans without health insurance coverage…
and the number of uninsured Americans continues to grow” 7. This well documented trend
continued in the subsequent years. In fact, the number of non-elderly Americans who lack
health insurance continues to rise by approximately 1 million per year, climbing to 45.6 million
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in 2005 and 47 million in 2006 8.When one considers the lack of universal health care or increase
in even partial insurance coverage, this number is surely expected to continue growing in the
coming years and to exert even more pressure on the current safety net for the uninsured.

Disproportionate increase in AMC burden

As the demand for charitable services is growing, the burden continues to fall
disproportionally on AMCs and faculty physicians. Many centers are located in close proximity
to disadvantaged neighborhoods, are historically tied to the care of the medically indigent and
are required by law (EMTALA laws of 1986) to screen and treat any unstable patient that enters
the hospital. AMCs are also often the only tertiary center for patients with specific needs (for
example burn victims) 9. One small example of this fact is described by Sheffield et al. in their
description of the mission of the Harborview Medical Center in Seattle WA. “Total revenue [at
Harborview Medical Center] in 2005 was $506 million and income exceeded expenditures by
$8.1 million (a 1.6%margin). UWSOM faculty and staff based at Harborview provided $98 million
in charity care during the year, which accounted for more than one-third of all charity care in
the state.”9

Another factor contributing to the burden at AMCs is inter-hospital transfers of
complicated uninsured inpatients. In The Relationship of Insurance Status, Hospital Ownership,
and Teaching Status with Inter-hospital Transfers in California in 2000, the authors determined
that County-owned hospitals and University of California teaching hospitals appear to have
received more patients whose primary reason for transfer may have been financial than did
other hospital groups 10.
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Results of Financial Pressures
The result of these many pressures is a predictable overall integrated focus towards
sustainability and profitability. Leadership and administrators (at both the hospital and faculty
practice plans) are obliged to confront these realities and readjust their priorities. However,
since Hospitals and Faculty Physicians respond to different pressures and operate in a different
legal environment, the strategies used to manage these issues differ and have different
outcomes on the care of the medically indigent. As stated by Dr. Cohen, president of the AAMC
in 2000, “Many circumstances are coming together to place unprecedented pressure on the
nation’s health care safety net.’’ 11

Compensatory/offsetting strategies for AMCs
Government subsidies to Hospitals
Compensation for the treatment of the uninsured is achieved by government subsidies
to hospitals through its Medicare and Medicaid payments. “Medicaid has two major programs
that help fund the cost of hospital uncompensated care: DSH payments and supplemental
payment programs. These programs also offset low Medicaid reimbursement rates in hospitals
that receive DSH payments. Medicaid DSH payments support both hospitals and long-term care
facilities that treat large numbers of poor patients. Medicare subsidizes uncompensated care
through its Medicare DSH payments and indirect medical education (IME) hospital payments.
Medicare’s DSH adjustment is applied to the payment rate for hospitals that treat a large
number of poor patients”3.

P a g e | 14

Limiting access to care, Increasing collections
Depending on ownership status of the hospital (for-profit, not-for-profit and public),
certain compensatory strategies have already been adopted. In Managing the Unmanaged,
Weiner et al. undertook the analysis of how 3 urban medical centers with differing ownership
models, within 1 metropolitan area, ration access to uncompensated care to uninsured patients.
They found that the public institution “provided the broadest access to the largest percentage of
self-pay patients but offset the burden with the most successful prepayment and collection
practices. The for-profit site obeyed federal regulations mandating emergency care but severely
curtailed non-ED services (referring to other institutions), and the not-for-profit limited access
(but not to the extent of the for-profit) and pursued collection (but not to the extent of the
public)” 12.

Compensatory strategies specific to physicians
Importance of physician’s role in medical center
The importance of physicians to the care of low-income persons is demonstrated by the
fact that roughly “one-third of uninsured persons and 58 percent of Medicaid enrollees report
that a physician’s office is the place where they usually receive medical care, a higher
percentage than that reported for both health centers and hospital-based facilities (unpublished
estimates from the 2003 Community Tracking Study Household Survey)”8.
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Physicians refuse care for Uninsured and Medicaid

However, “physicians are not legally obligated to care for Medicaid recipients or the
uninsured, and most doctors limit such care, although the American Medical Association (AMA)
emphasizes that physicians should render medical services to indigent patients and tend to the
welfare of the community”8.

Given the importance of physicians as a source of care for low-income uninsured and
Medicaid enrollees, Cunningham et al. state that “policymakers should be concerned about
recent trend data from the Community Tracking Study Physician Survey showing that the
number of physicians providing charity care and accepting Medicaid patients has been
decreasing since the mid-1990s”13. The percentage of physicians providing any charity care has
fallen fairly substantially, from 76.3 percent in 1996/1997 to 68.2 percent in 2004/2005. Also, a
growing number of physicians derive no revenue from Medicaid and are not accepting new
Medicaid patients, although the change between 1996/1997 and 2004/2005 has not been as
great as that for physicians’ charity care.

Lack of DSH-type payments to support Physician practices?
Given the important role played by physicians (and especially faculty physicians) in the
provision of care to the medically indigent, it is noteworthy that no direct government subsidy
directly supports their efforts. As noted by Barrett: “Government programs have subsidized
hospitals treating a disproportionate amount of poor patients (e.g., the disproportionate share
hospital payment adjustment and Medicare’s indirect medical education adjustment); however,
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these programs have not included physicians. Further, emergency physician groups do not have
other business units or sources of revenue to subsidize high levels of uncompensated care
costs”2.
Blumenthal et al. describe the situation as follows: “Faculty Physician Practices do not
receive the financial consideration from government for their clinical services that hospitals do.
AHC hospitals are eligible for significant payment adjustments from Medicare and Medicaid to
support the cost of their care to the poor and uninsured. Medicare and Medicaid
disproportionate share policies provide substantial funding for hospitals with an unusually high
volume of care to poor Medicare and Medicaid patients. Yet, neither public plan offers
comparable support to physicians and faculty practice plans. In fact, Medicare and Medicaid
payments for physician services have been falling. On an inflation-adjusted basis, FPP Medicare
revenues fell by nearly 10 percent (9.8%) from 1995 to 1998; Medicaid patient revenues were
down 15.2 percent”.3

Adjustments in compensation plans to prioritize financial sustainability
Academic departments have supported their faculty in clinical, research, and teaching
areas in the past; nonetheless, due to economic trends in the healthcare environment, this has
created a challenge to departments based at academic medical centers. In the past, excess
revenue was used to support teaching and research, however; with the decrease in
reimbursement and increase in documentation, this is no longer possible. Because of these
changes, academic healthcare organizations are focusing now, more than ever before, on their
physician compensation plans as most practices in integrated healthcare systems are having
difficulty meeting their salaries and overhead” 13.
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According to Rimar in Strategic Planning and the Balanced Scorecard for Faculty Practice Plans
“strategic planning is critical for faculty practice plans since they are, in many ways, more
vulnerable to competition than the other components of AHCs. Without financial reserves or
government subsidies, practice plans must pay for their entire operations from clinical
revenues” 14.

Financial Incentive structures
Given the need for sustainable faculty practices, compensation plans now center around
the benchmarking of clinical performance. Strategies to maximize earnings entail focusing on
variables such as gross charges, collections, net charges and work relative value units (wRVUs).
The following provides short definitions.

Gross Charges: Gross charges are a simple reflection of actual practice activities. However, the
disadvantage is that they do not accurately reflect the actual collections from patients and
payers.

Collections (Payments): Collections reflect money actually received. Establishing physician
bonuses, however, on collections can penalize the physicians that service the medically indigent.

Net Charges: Net Charges are gross charges minus contractual adjustments. This method can
also cause physicians to get more or less credit for their work based on the reimbursement of
the payers.
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Work Relative Value Units (wRVUs):. Work RVUs measure the clinical effort of the provider and
are linked to the current procedural terminology (CPT) codes. Activity can be compared with
other practices across the country. The advantage of wRVUs is that it does not rely on payer mix,
collection ratios, or use of laboratories. 13

Results of Overall Strategies
As faculty plans become more sophisticated at maximizing earnings potential, the
pressure to curtail non- profitable endeavors such as charity care increases significantly.
Coleman describes the current situation in Academic Medicine in 2006 as follows: “Faculty in
clinical departments typically face very high practice costs and are reimbursed for clinical
services by insurers whose rates have not kept pace with inflation in the cost of health care.
Accordingly, the margins of clinical practice in medical schools and AMCs are increasingly unable
to cross-subsidize the care of uninsured patients from the care of insured patients.
Consequently, individual faculty and clinical departments are under increasing pressure to limit
care of uninsured patients.”6

Need to quantify social mission, value of charity care
Given the current trends and the impact on charity care, proper accounting and
trending of the amounts of uncompensated care is important. This is especially true at Academic
Medical Centers where a significant portion of this care is provided. In their analysis as part of
the Task Force for The Commonwealth Fund, Blumenthal et al recommended that “AHCs and
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public authorities must develop improved information on the content and amounts of missionrelated activities undertaken at AHCs”. Specifically, they recommend that “1-Government at all
levels should invest in research and development necessary to develop valid and reliable
measures of performance in mission-related areas and 2- Data on the quantity, quality, and
productivity of mission-related activities and their associated clinical expenses at institutions
seeking public support for those expenses should be publicly available.”1

Previous Attempts to Model Free Care (Methods of tabulating/ calculating)
Several states have enacted laws which define a minimum level of charity care that nonprofit hospitals must provide in order to retain their tax-exempt status. “In Texas, for example,
hospitals must document that they’re providing charity care equal to 4% of the hospital’s
patient revenue, excluding bad debt” 15.
In the preceding decades, although the AMA has performed yearly surveys to calculate
free and discounted care at hospitals, few studies have actually attempted to calculate the
“quantity, quality, and productivity” of uncompensated care by physicians15. As stated by Hadley
and Holahan in Health Affairs in 2003, “no single data source provides complete unambiguous
and precise information” 16. Previous attempts have centered on the use of self-reported surveys
of patients and physicians.

Community-tracking study (Cunningham et al.)
CTS is a nationally representative telephone survey of physicians involved in direct care
in the continental U.S. This survey asked physicians about the share of patients who receive free
or reduced price care due to financial need (but without distinguishing insured versus
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uninsured), and the percentage of practice time spent providing such care. The most recent
round of this study (2004–2005) found that 68.2% of physicians provide such “charity care”, and
that, among physicians providing such care, it amounts to 6.3% of their time 17.

Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
This approach uses household survey data collected by the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS). MEPS obtains information on services used from household respondents and
then contacts providers to identify amounts and sources of payment for the respondents’ care.

AMA Socioeconomic Monitoring System
An analysis of data from the American Medical Association’s (AMA’s) 1994
Socioeconomic Monitoring System found that “67.7 percent of physicians provided some
uncompensated care and that those physicians spent an average of 7.2 hours per week
delivering that care. Using an estimate (from the same study) of physicians’ average gross
earnings per hour of $105 and inflating to 2001 prices produces an estimate of $9.1 billion in
uncompensated care delivered by physicians”15.

Drawbacks to using survey data
One important consideration with the use of survey data are the confounders.
Inherent in self-reported accounting of care is recall bias and a propensity to overestimate
donated time. Thus, the lack of primary financial data creates difficulty in valuing and trending
the amount of care actually provided.
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However, the attempt to use financial data to value physician activities also presents
challenges. For example, how does one value a physician’s time and which values should be
used: net charges, collections or RVUs? Since reimbursements are largely dictated by Medicare,
Medicaid and the rates negotiated with private insurance companies, no single “value” exists for
each billable physician activity.
One result of this differential billing system is in fact the paradoxically higher charges
faced by non-insured or self-pay patients. In fact, as reported in Medical Fees Are Often Higher
For Patients Without Insurance, “… the uninsured are outside of the system and have no one to
negotiate for them. So they end up charged the higher prices” 18. The result of ongoing
negotiated payments discounts by large insurer groups and government entities results in very
inflated non-negotiated charges on which they apply the discount.
Without the support of such entities, self-pay patients as a whole are charged
substantially higher rates. Even with personally discounted rates including complete write-offs
(when patients are deemed indigent by virtue of limited resources), self-pay patients as a whole
generate a significant stream of revenue (even if a significant portion of these self-pay patients
aren’t able to pay anything).

Valuing free time as Opportunity Costs
In the article How much Uncompensated Care do doctor’s provide?, Gruber
attempted to get at this apparent paradox by valuing physician donated time as the amount
they were forgoing by seeing an indigent patient instead of a paying patient. They stated that:
“The magnitude of provider uncompensated care has become an important public policy issue.
Yet existing measures of uncompensated care are flawed because they compare uninsured
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payments to list prices, not to the prices actually paid by the insured.”15 In their attempt, they
used financial data from almost 4000 physicians from all types of practices (private, groups and
faculty), and measured “uncompensated care as the net amount that physicians lose by lower
payments from the uninsured than from the insured.”15

This approach “implicitly asks the question: if each provider could replace each
uninsured patient with an insured patient who received the same level of care, would the
provider expect to make more or less? If the uninsured patient paid the same amount the
average insurance company would pay (to the same doctor, for the same procedure), then we
say there is no uncompensated care.”15

The results from this approach were surprising. Gruber and Rodriguez essentially found
“that physicians [as a whole] provide negative uncompensated care to the uninsured, earning
more on uninsured patients than on insured patients with comparable treatments.” 15

These results counter the more commonly held view about physician charity. In their
article, however, the distribution of charity care was of course not distributed evenly among
different physicians. While overall physicians were providing limited or negative amounts of
care in terms of value as opportunity cost, some physicians were providing quite a lot of
uncompensated care.
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Gruber and Rodriguez, How much uncompensated care do doctor’s provide?, Journal of Health
Economics 2007

Where do faculty physicians fall on this spectrum?
The value of uncompensated care generated by Academic faculty physicians within the
above distribution is unknown but likely quite high and thus of great interest in quantifying and
following over time. This is especially true when considering the disproportionately large
proportion of uncompensated care being provided in AMCs and thus the large potential impact
of a change in physician behavior regarding uncompensated care.
Since these values (based on this approach) are largely unknown and/or unpublished in
academic faculty practices, calculating the data based on the financial data for one fiscal year at
one academic practice is a reasonable starting point for further comparisons.
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Statement of purpose specific hypothesis and specific aims of thesis:

•

To measure the amount of “uncompensated care” provided to
medically indigent patients by Faculty at an Academic Medical Center in
terms of an opportunity cost model.

•

To determine the value of uncompensated care by department

•

To compare the values obtained in this study to current estimates
of uncompensated care
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Methods:

Literature search for current understanding and valuation of care provided by academic
physicians
OVID Medline was searched for any article reporting on uncompensated care at academic
medical centers using the following parameters:
Results Generated From:
Ovid MEDLINE(R) <1950 to June Week 1 2009>
Ovid MEDLINE(R) <2005 to June Week 1 2009> (updates since 2009-06-01)

Set Search
Results #Articles
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------001 medically uninsured.mp. or exp Medically Uninsured/
1428
002 medical indigency.mp. or exp Medical Indigency/
112
003 uncompensated care.mp. or exp Uncompensated Care/
462
004 self pay.mp.
79
005 1 or 2 or 3 or 4
1929
006 exp Faculty, Medical/
1530
007 exp Academic Medical Centers/
11246
008 ((academic or faculty or medical) adj2 (practice or group or plan)).tw.
3004
009 8 or 6 or 7
15026
010 9 and 5
41
011 reimbursement.mp. or exp Reimbursement, Disproportionate Sha
6845
re/ or exp Insurance, Health, Reimbursement/ or exp Reimburs
ement Mechanisms/ or exp Reimbursement, Incentive/
012 11 and 10
5
013 Health services accessibility.mp. or exp Health Services Acc
15477
essibility/
014 13 and 10
9
015 exp Schools, Medical/
2278
016 10 and 15
6
017 exp Physician's Practice Patterns/
11175
018 10 and 17
0
019 exp Group Practice/ or exp Practice Management/ or exp Pract
5609
ice Management, Medical/
020 19 and 10
2
021 exp Fees, Medical/
299
022 21 and 10
0
023 exp Employee Incentive Plans/
175
024 23 and 10
0
025 physician incentive plan.mp. or exp Physician Incentive Plan
469
026
027
028
029
030

25 and 10
26 or 12 or 20 or 14 or 22 or 18 or 24 or 16
27 or 10
Uncompensated Care Provided by.m_titl.
medically uninsured.mp. or exp Medically Uninsured/

0
17
41
1
1428
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031 medical indigency.mp. or exp Medical Indigency/
032 uncompensated care.mp. or exp Uncompensated Care/
033 self pay.mp.
034 30 or 31 or 32 or 33
035 exp Faculty, Medical/
036 exp Academic Medical Centers/
037 ((academic or faculty or medical) adj2 (practice or group or plan)).tw.
038 37 or 35 or 36
039 38 and 34
040 reimbursement.mp. or exp Reimbursement, Disproportionate Sha
re/ or exp Insurance, Health, Reimbursement/ or exp Reimburs
ement Mechanisms/ or exp Reimbursement, Incentive/
041 40 and 39
042 Health services accessibility.mp. or exp Health Services Acc
essibility/
043 42 and 39
044 exp Schools, Medical/
045 39 and 44
046 exp Physician's Practice Patterns/
047 39 and 46
048 exp Group Practice/ or exp Practice Management/ or exp Pract
ice Management, Medical/
049 48 and 39
050 exp Fees, Medical/
051 50 and 39
052 exp Employee Incentive Plans/
053 52 and 39
054 physician incentive plan.mp. or exp Physician Incentive Plan
055
056
057
058
059
060

54 and 39
55 or 41 or 49 or 43 or 51 or 47 or 53 or 45
56 or 39
exp Physicians/
58 or 38
34 and 59

112
462
79
1929
1530
11246
3004
15026
41
6845

5
15477
9
2278
6
11175
0
5609
2
299
0
175
0
469
0
17
41
11899
26181
76

Financial Data mining of primary financial data from Yale Medical Group financial
services
The information about uncompensated care at YMG was pulled from Precision Business
Intelligence (PBI), the business analytical tool utilized to analyze and report data. Data from the
IDX/GE Centricity financial system is extracted nightly through Global Works.
BAR is the Billing and Accounts Receivable application that maintains the complete accounting
of all patient financial activity. The queries were based on transaction level information from
BAR.
Data for Free Care Write-Offs for FY2008 was sorted by department and includes any invoice
that had Free Care paycodes listed below, and the total charges, units, and payments posted on
that invoice. Data for Bad Debt Write-Offs for FY2008 was sorted by department and includes
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any invoice that had Bad Debt paycodes listed below, and the total charges, units, and payments
posted on that invoice.

The following paycodes as Free Care and Bad Debt were used to determine the amount of
uncompensated financial services 1) Free Care
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FINANCIAL HARDSHIP DISCOUNT
FINANCIAL HARDSHIP FEDERAL POVERTY GUIDELINES
MAMO CHARITY DISCOUNT
PHYSICIAN DETERMINED FINANCIAL HARDSHIP
YDR CHARITY WRITEOFF
PROFESSIONAL COURTESY DISCOUNT
ANESTHESIA/SURG RESIDENT COSMETIC DISCOUNT
INTL SVC FREE CARE DISCOUNT
CITY WELFARE NH ADJ

2) Bad Debt
*
*
*
*
*

BANKRUPTCY
DECEASED PT-NO ESTATE ADJ
PETER ROBERTS AND ASSOC WRITE-OFF
TRANS CONTINENTAL WRITE-OFF
SMALL BALANCE ADJ
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Approach to calculation of Uncompensated Care

Formula Free Care for each department for each year:
{(Total payments/total charges ) * total Free Care Charges } – Actual payments from Free Care
accounts

Formula Bad debt for each department for each year:
{(Total payments/total charges ) * total Bad debt Charges } – Actual payments from Bad Debt
accounts

Total Uncompensated Care = Free Care + Bad Debt

Example:
Three patients are each billed 1000$ for the same procedure by a physician under Yale Medical
Group. The first patient is privately insured and the negotiated rate is 200$, the second has
Medicare and the rate is 100$ and the third has Medicaid with a rate of 50$. The average rate of
payment for an insured patient for this procedure is thus (200+100+50/ 3*1000) = 11.6%.
If a patient is uninsured and billed 1000$ for the same procedure, they will probably receive a
discount or simply not pay (or both). However, the average uninsured patient will pay
something and YMG will receive that amount. For example, the average amount received for
this procedure could be 56$ for uninsured patients.
The opportunity cost, (assuming an endless supply of insured patient) of seeing an uninsured
patient instead of an insured patient in this scenario would be {(1000 * 11.6%)}-56$ = 60$. Thus
there is a 60$ “uncompensated care opportunity cost” for every uninsured individual
undergoing this procedure.
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Results:
Table 1: Fiscal Year 2008 Total Charges with calculated % reimbursements

Department

Charges

Payments

ANESTHESIOLOGY
CHILD STUDY
CENTER

$86,340,161
$4,067,182

$3,080,599

DERMATOLOGY
DERMATOPATHOL
OGY LAB
DIAGNOSTIC
RADIOLOGY

$35,155,105

$20,106,339

$813,713

$597,509

$45,289,045

GENETICS
INTERNAL
MEDICINE
LABORATORY
MEDICINE
NEUROLOGY

$30,814,569

Corrected
Charges
(Total Uncomp)
$82,465,342

Corrected
Payments
(Total Uncomp)

%
Reimbu
rsement
(of
Correct
ed
Charge
s)

$30,066,959

36.46

$3,977,947

$3,055,423

76.81

$34,070,532

$19,713,614

57.86

$786,327

$584,673

74.36

$15,915,781

$41,959,718

$15,365,275

36.62

$6,241,977

$2,576,160

$5,964,065

$2,480,663

41.59

$82,627,369

$26,562,646

$77,093,326

$25,505,855

33.08

$2,691,160

$809,028

$2,551,744

$790,562

30.98

$7,050,972

$2,619,401

$6,686,163

$2,547,631

38.10

NEUROSURGERY

$17,060,834

$4,903,132

$16,389,247

$4,738,692

28.91

OB/GYN

$49,603,859

$20,871,263

$47,727,321

$20,353,000

42.64

OPHTHALMOLOGY

$14,270,012

$4,750,649

$13,399,894

$4,546,797

33.93

ORTHOPAEDICS

$28,396,267

$9,760,040

$26,979,111

$9,455,522

35.05

PATHOLOGY

$48,362,457

$23,458,338

$46,417,049

$22,945,207

49.43

PEDIATRICS

$50,471,996

$17,746,371

$48,752,304

$17,240,121

35.36

PSYCHIATRY

$2,707,367

$763,004

$2,303,332

$695,015

30.17

$85,821,866

$28,547,223

$81,432,580

$27,728,397

34.05

$28,715,996

$9,620,727

$24,037,206

$9,284,817

38.63

$20,794,785

$7,606,242

$20,064,968

$7,493,949

37.35

SURGERY
SURGERY
EMERGENCY
MEDICINE
THERAPEUTIC
RADIOLOGY
YALE CANCER
CENTER
Totals

$10,024,286

$5,289,834

$9,379,091

$5,102,379

54.40

$627,873,637

$236,911,667

$593,778,972

$230,203,788

38.77
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Table 2: Fiscal Year 2008 Medicaid Charges with calculated % reimbursements

Department
ANESTHE-SIOLOGY
CHILD STUDY
CENTER
DERMATOLOGY
DERMATOPATHOLOGY LAB
DIAGNOSTIC
RADIOLOGY

Medicaid
Charges

Medicaid
Payments

Corrected
Charges
(Total Uncomp)
$82,465,342

Corrected
Charges Medicaid
$70,453,425

Corrected
Payments
(Total Uncomp)
$30,066,959

%
Reimb.
Corrected
Charge
s)

%Reim
b.
Medicai
d

$28,792,056

36.46

40.87

Corrected
Payments Medicaid

$12,011,917

$1,274,903.45

$2,526,300

$1,944,500.32

$3,977,947

$1,451,647

$3,055,423

$1,110,923

76.81

76.53

$296,703

$58,522.80

$34,070,532

$33,773,829

$19,713,614

$19,655,091

57.86

58.20

$5,188

$4,588.41

$786,327

$781,139

$584,673

$580,085

74.36

74.26
38.43

$5,958,674

$1,529,988.50

$41,959,718

$36,001,044

$15,365,275

$13,835,287

36.62

GENETICS
INTERNAL
MEDICINE
LABORATORY
MEDICINE

$1,045,202

$236,548.80

$5,964,065

$4,918,863

$2,480,663

$2,244,114

41.59

45.62

$9,735,152

$1,706,899.22

$77,093,326

$67,358,174

$25,505,855

$23,798,956

33.08

35.33

$356,168

$46,512.07

$2,551,744

$2,195,576

$790,562

$744,050

30.98

33.89

NEUROLOGY

$1,060,056

$172,201.67

$6,686,163

$5,626,107

$2,547,631

$2,375,429

38.1

42.22

NEURO-SURGERY

$2,814,390

$327,504.56

$16,389,247

$13,574,857

$4,738,692

$4,411,187

28.91

32.50

$10,678,841

$2,988,945.78

$47,727,321

$37,048,480

$20,353,000

$17,364,054

42.64

46.87

OPHTHAL-MOLOGY

$2,728,861

$397,534.82

$13,399,894

$10,671,033

$4,546,797

$4,149,262

33.93

38.88

ORTHOPAEDICS

$2,829,343

$393,585.60

$26,979,111

$24,149,768

$9,455,522

$9,061,936

35.05

37.52

PATHOLOGY

$3,153,417

$596,035.50

$46,417,049

$43,263,632

$22,945,207

$22,349,172

49.43

51.66

PEDIATRICS

$21,453,552

$3,978,355.01

$48,752,304

$27,298,752

$17,240,121

$13,261,766

35.36

48.58

$891,790

$176,454.16

$2,303,332

$1,411,542

$695,015

$518,561

30.17

36.74

$13,614,661

$1,974,710.11

$81,432,580

$67,817,919

$27,728,397

$25,753,687

34.05

37.97

$6,744,143

$1,038,933.94

$24,037,206

$17,293,063

$9,284,817

$8,245,883

38.63

47.68

$1,135,158

$185,102.24

$20,064,968

$18,929,810

$7,493,949

$7,308,847

37.35

38.61

$652,405

$131,764.43

$9,379,091

$8,726,686

$5,102,379

$4,970,615

54.4

56.96

$100,672,266

$19,546,999

$593,778,972

$493,106,706

$230,203,788

$210,656,789

38.77

42.72

OB/GYN

PSYCHIATRY
SURGERY
SURGERY
EMERGENCY
MEDICINE
THERAPEUTIC
RADIOLOGY

YALE CANCER
CENTER

Totals
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Table 3 : Fiscal Year 2008 Uncompensated Care generated from outstanding “Bad
Debt” Accounts per department

Department
ANESTHESIOLOGY
CHILD STUDY
CENTER

Charges

Units

Payments

Write-off's

Expected
Reimburse
ment
(based on
%
Reimburse
ment)

Expected
Reimbursem
ent (Medicaid
Adjust)

Uncompen
sated care
(expected
Reimb Payments)

Uncompen
sated care
(Medicaid
Adjust)

$2,812,016

19,264

$655,642

$1,048,738

$1,025,264

$1,149,181

$369,622

$493,539

$41,855

355

$4,686

$34,077

$32,148

$32,031

$27,462

$27,345

$731,553

3,106

$345,390

$175,450

$423,285

$425,736

$77,895

$80,346

$24,740

156

$12,143

$9,416

$18,395

$18,372

$6,252

$6,229

$2,323,143

22,982

$528,145

$811,406

$850,714

$892,789

$322,570

$364,645

$252,450

1,155

$92,925

$69,008

$105,003

$115,174

$12,077

$22,249

$3,901,268

14,124

$1,013,076

$1,253,776

$1,290,711

$1,378,394

$277,634

$365,318

$100,902

673

$17,797

$33,200

$31,261

$34,194

$13,464

$16,397

$259,155

2,450

$69,591

$89,629

$98,746

$109,419

$29,154

$39,828

$514,923

695

$131,412

$122,886

$148,882

$167,326

$17,470

$35,914

OB/GYN
OPHTHALMOLOGY

$1,600,452

4,438

$480,793

$529,072

$682,502

$750,107

$201,710

$269,315

$650,897

1,746

$187,499

$192,893

$220,860

$253,091

$33,360

$65,592

ORTHOPAEDICS

$1,073,007

2,522

$295,411

$361,099

$376,063

$402,634

$80,652

$107,223

PATHOLOGY

$1,657,914

10,164

$493,386

$649,253

$819,552

$856,447

$326,166

$363,061

PEDIATRICS

$1,569,402

5,901

$490,260

$551,566

$554,983

$762,417

$64,723

$272,157

$279,345

1,470

$39,972

$165,982

$84,290

$102,623

$44,319

$62,652

$2,865,354

5,379

$743,358

$1,086,455

$975,674

$1,088,111

$232,316

$344,753

$3,152,498

12,308

$320,589

$2,437,744

$1,217,711

$1,503,211

$897,122

$1,182,62
2

$413,089

996

$104,176

$102,327

$154,282

$159,495

$50,106

$55,319

$472,555

1,710

$175,747

$117,286

$257,078

$269,162

$24,717,685

111,673

$6,205,523

$9,855,353

$9,582,866

$10,559,475

$81,331
$3,377,34
3

$93,415
$4,353,95
2

DERMATOLOGY
DERMATOPATH
OLOGY LAB
DIAGNOSTIC
RADIOLOGY
GENETICS
INTERNAL
MEDICINE
LABORATORY
MEDICINE
NEUROLOGY
NEUROSURGERY

PSYCHIATRY
SURGERY
SURGERY
EMERGENCY
MEDICINE
THERAPEUTIC
RADIOLOGY
YALE CANCER
CENTER
Totals

Bad Debt Financial Categories include:
-BANKRUPTCY
-DECEASED PT-NO ESTATE ADJ
-PETER ROBERTS AND ASSOC WRITE-OFF
-TRANS CONTINENTAL WRITE-OFF
-SMALL BALANCE ADJ
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Table 4: Fiscal Year 2008 Uncompensated Care generated from outstanding “Free
Care” Accounts per department

Department
ANESTHESIOLOGY
CHILD STUDY
CENTER
DERMATOLOGY
DERMATOPATHOLOGY
LAB
DIAGNOSTIC
RADIOLOGY
GENETICS
INTERNAL
MEDICINE
LABORATORY
MEDICINE

Charges

Payments

Write-off's

Expected
Reimbursem
ent (based on
%
Reimbursem
ent)

Expected
Reimbursem
ent (Medicaid
Adjust)

Uncompensat
ed care

Uncompensat
ed Care
(Medicaid
Adjust)

$1,062,803

$91,968

$952,263

$387,499.20

$434,333.50

$295,531.41

$342,365.71

$47,380

$20,490

$26,374

$36,392.12

$36,259.17

$15,901.90

$15,768.95

$353,020

$47,335

$267,016

$204,261.56

$205,444.29

$156,926.70

$158,109.43

$2,646

$692

$1,701

$1,967.43

$1,964.96

$1,275.14

$1,272.67

$1,006,184

$22,362

$938,376

$368,455.61

$386,678.89

$346,093.88

$364,317.16

$25,462

$2,572

$21,342

$10,590.54

$11,616.43

$8,018.90

$9,044.79

$1,632,775

$43,715

$1,484,885

$540,193.61

$576,891.23

$496,478.40

$533,176.02

$38,514

$669

$36,451

$11,932.11

$13,051.85

$11,262.82

$12,382.56

NEUROLOGY
NEUROSURGERY

$105,654

$2,178

$99,360

$40,257.39

$44,608.75

$38,079.02

$42,430.38

$156,664

$33,028

$118,128

$45,296.93

$50,908.40

$12,269.29

$17,880.76

OB/GYN
OPHTHALMOLOGY
ORTHOPAEDICS

$276,086

$37,470

$197,421

$117,735.05

$129,397.28

$80,265.02

$91,927.25

$219,222

$16,352

$189,786

$74,385.52

$85,241.00

$58,033.29

$68,888.77

$344,149

$9,107

$317,679

$120,615.85

$129,138.15

$111,509.12

$120,031.42

PATHOLOGY

$287,494

$19,746

$247,064

$142,116.08

$148,513.95

$122,370.55

$128,768.42

PEDIATRICS

$150,290

$15,990

$123,720

$53,146.57

$73,011.06

$37,156.99

$57,021.48

PSYCHIATRY

$124,690

$28,018

$70,545

$37,624.35

$45,807.60

$9,606.79

$17,790.04

SURGERY
SURGERY
EMERGENCY
MEDICINE
THERAPEUTIC
RADIOLOGY
YALE CANCER
CENTER

$1,523,932

$75,468

$1,326,546

$518,910.27

$578,709.56

$443,441.86

$503,241.15

$1,526,292

$15,321

$1,464,778

$589,558.60

$727,784.62

$574,237.88

$712,463.90

$316,728

$8,117

$276,833

$118,292.91

$122,289.47

$110,176.14

$114,172.70

$172,640

$11,709

$145,839

$93,918.98

$98,333.65

$82,210.29

$86,624.96

Totals

$9,376,980

$502,357

$8,310,236

$3,635,387

$4,005,876

$3,133,030

$3,503,519

Free Care Financial Categories include:
-FINANCIAL HARDSHIP DISCOUNT
-FINANCIAL HARDSHIP FEDERAL POVERTY GUIDELINES
-MAMO CHARITY DISCOUNT
-PHYSICIAN DETERMINED FINANCIAL HARDSHIP
-YDR CHARITY WRITEOFF
-PROFESSIONAL COURTESY DISCOUNT
-ANESTHESIA/SURG RESIDENT COSMETIC DISCOUNT
-INTL SVC FREE CARE DISCOUNT
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Table 5: Fiscal Year 2008 Total Uncompensated Care as a % of total payments per
department

Department
ANESTHESIOLOGY
CHILD STUDY CENTER

Total Amount
$665,153.87

Total Amount
(Medicaid
Adjustment)
$835,904.65

% of
Payments

%Payments
(Medicaid
Adjustment)

2.16

2.71
1.40

$43,364.24

$43,113.84

1.41

$234,821.88

$238,455.53

1.17

1.19

$7,527.60

$7,501.96

1.26

1.26

$668,663.46

$728,961.85

4.20

4.58

$20,096.35

$31,293.78

0.78

1.21

$774,112.56

$898,493.57

2.91

3.38

LABORATORY MEDICINE

$24,726.36

$28,779.70

3.06

3.56

NEUROLOGY

$67,233.51

$82,258.19

2.57

3.14

NEUROSURGERY

$29,739.26

$53,794.53

0.61

1.10

$281,974.54

$361,241.91

1.35

1.73

$91,393.70

$134,480.44

1.92

2.83

ORTHOPAEDICS

$192,160.74

$227,254.35

1.97

2.33

PATHOLOGY

$448,536.39

$491,829.29

1.91

2.10

PEDIATRICS

$101,879.58

$329,178.81

0.57

1.85

PSYCHIATRY

$53,925.63

$80,441.94

7.07

10.54

$675,758.14

$847,994.25

2.37

2.97

$1,471,359.49

$1,895,086.10

15.29

19.70

$160,282.50

$169,491.52

2.11

2.23

$163,541.27

$180,039.91

3.09

3.40

$6,510,373.65

$7,857,471.85

2.75

3.32

DERMATOLOGY
DERMATOPATHOLOGY LAB
DIAGNOSTIC RADIOLOGY
GENETICS
INTERNAL MEDICINE

OB/GYN
OPHTHALMOLOGY

SURGERY
SURGERY EMERGENCY
MEDICINE
THERAPEUTIC RADIOLOGY
YALE CANCER CENTER
Totals
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Discussion:
Based on a large literature search, no values for uncompensated care have previously
been generated using an opportunity cost model to value physician time at a single institution.
Although Gruber et al. provided the analysis of a larger group of physicians, the large spectrum
of practice settings and their various administration models and incentives structures creates
some difficulty in pinpointing the source of uncompensated care and makes it somewhat more
complex to track over time. Using their approach, one could imagine a situation in which some
physicians (perhaps in AMCs) would provide ever more uncompensated care while, at the same
time, physicians in other locations would “counteract” these values with more profitable
enterprises. In such a situation, charity care by certain physicians would be masked by profits
generated by their colleagues.
The benefit of using a single AMC with a centralized governing model is the potential to
link changes in administrative incentives with changes in uncompensated care outcomes.
Presumably, an AMC such as Yale, based on the historic charitable mission and proximity to
disadvantaged patients and large clinical infrastructure, can exert a large influence over the
uncompensated care dynamics in its community. Any change in the provision of such care at
such an institution would have many ramifications. Thus, the appropriate valuing of such care is
a requisite first step.

Write-offs
The use of write-offs (included in the first 3 tables of the results) highlights an important
issue in valuing charitable care. Inherent in the accounting of write offs is the difference
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between the charges generated for a patient and the actual payments made by that patient.
However, as stated earlier, this difference reflects a largely inflated value generated by the
inflated non-negotiated charges charged to self-pay patients. Since the inflated prices are
generated from negotiated rates and not from market forces, these prices represent a slightly
skewed “value”. An example from Table 2 will help clarify this. In 2008, the Anesthesiology
department generated $2,812,016 in charges and $1,025,264 in write offs. However, using the
opportunity cost model described in the methods section, the value of uncompensated care was
$369,622. This represents a significant difference.

Comparison of values
Using the opportunity cost approach, the total value of Uncompensated Care provided
by physicians in Fiscal Year 2008 as part of the Yale Medical Group was $6,510,373.65. This
represents 2.75% of the total payments made for the same year. This percentage can be
compared to other estimates of the provision of such care.

Comparison to write-offs
The total “Write-offs” for FY2008 (Bad debt and Free Care total write-offs) was
$18,165,589 whereas the calculated total “Uncompensated care” was $6,510,373.65. The total
in terms of percentage would be 7.67% of total payments vs. 2.75%. Again, these estimates
reflect the different “valuing” of physician time.

Comparison to earlier published estimates
Because estimates of physician-provided care are sparse, values from previous studies
are not current and cannot be directly compared to the values generated in this study. However,
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they can provide a sense of the effects of different accounting mechanisms and the evolution in
levels of care provided. In 1978, Sloan et al., using a 1977 nationwide survey of physicians, “
found that charity care amounted to 2.7% of gross billings and that bad debts accounted for an
additional 8.4% of gross billings”15 with a total of more than 11% of billings. In 1985, Ohsfeldt
used the AMA’s “Socioeconomic Monitoring System from 1982 found that physicians donated
9% of billings to charity care and 6.3% to bad debt with a total of 15.3% of billings. In 1991,
Kilpatrick et al. found that 10.4 % of billed amounts of a random sample of physicians from
Florida were unresolved (and hence, constituted a combination of bad debt and charity care). All
of these previous studies used billed charges and hence generated values many times higher
than the calculated amounts in this study. However, as stated earlier, it must be kept in mind
that the billed amounts do not represent “real” market value.

Comparison to analysis by Gruber et al in “How much uncompensated care do
doctors provide?”
In their analysis of uncompensated care provided by physicians, Gruber determined that
even in their most generous estimates, physicians provided no more than 0.8% of
uncompensated care and that they were most likely providing no overall uncompensated care
whatsoever. They did, however, describe a system in which uncompensated care was unevenly
distributed. Based on the findings generated in this study, physicians at Academic Medical
Centers such as Yale would constitute a distinct subpopulation that would fall on the right upper
hand side of the graph describing the distribution of uncompensated care (starred on following
graph).
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Assuming that both the current study and the Gruber study accurately represent reality,
the combined interpretation of these results would suggest that academic physicians as a whole
at Yale are more “generous” than most physicians (~ 65% of all physicians) but that many more
physicians (~35%) in different settings are providing higher levels of uncompensated care.

Breakdown per department
Of course, physicians at Yale practice under different clinical circumstances and treat a
different patient payer mix. As could be predicted, different departments at Yale provide
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different levels of uncompensated care and this is reflected in the result in Table 1. In FY2008,
these values ranged from 0.57% (in Pediatrics) to 15.29% (in Emergency Surgery).
The striking difference in levels of uncompensated care in different departments can, to
some extent, be explained by certain obligations and government support. For example, the
department offering the lowest calculated amount of uncompensated care, Pediatrics, treats a
population that is largely covered by Connecticut Husky Healthcare (the CT SCHIP program). The
department offering the highest level of uncompensated care, Emergency Surgery, is required
by the EMTALA laws of 1986 to stabilize patients regardless of insurance status and effectively
“donates” very costly surgical interventions often without being reimbursed.
Of specific interest are the departments that fall in between these two predictable
extremes. For example, the department of Neurosurgery provided $29,739,260 of
uncompensated care or 0.61% of total payments ($4,903,132) for the year 2008 while the
department of Neurology provided $67,233.51 or 2.57% of total payments ($2,619,401). This
400% difference in rates would suggest that the department of Neurosurgery either passively
benefits from a better payer mix or that it actively limits donations of free services or that it
exerts more effective billing collection strategies, (or a combination of these factors).
At any rate, the differences in departmental uncompensated care values highlighted by
this approach would not otherwise have been so apparent. In fact, if one were to look simply at
write-offs, the Neurology and Neurosurgery departments would look much more similar. Under
total write-offs for 2008, Neurology donated $188,989 (7.2% of payments) whereas
Neurosurgery donated $241,014 (5.0% of payments) for a much smaller interdepartmental
difference of 144%.
Thus, simply being aware of these calculated values opens up a series of questions
regarding departmental policies and priorities regarding the care of the medically indigent.
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Although it may be possible that no individual physician purposefully or actively limits the care
of the indigent, the marked differences in values for certain departments in Table4 does call into
question departmental incentive structures that may, in reality, be influencing outcomes in an
indirect fashion. As one example illustrates, policies aimed at shortening delays for insured
patients would effectively curtail uncompensated care in an environment where clinics are
already near full capacity.
Simply being aware of these values is important as any departmental policy change has
the potential to affect uncompensated care. Knowledge of current values could serve as a
means of setting baseline statistics and determining eventual departmental targets.

Medicaid Adjustments
Included in the result tables are the adjustments to the uncompensated care values
generated by subtracting the charges and payments made on the behalf of patients covered by
Medicaid. Since Medicaid pays on average less than Medicare and private insurance and since
many physicians in the community at large are able to refuse Medicaid patients, payments
made under this government insurance plan decreased the average opportunity cost and in
effects lowers the amount of uncompensated care calculated with this model. These results
demonstrate the expected results: removing Medicaid patients from the average increases the
amount of uncompensated care provided. Overall, this represents an increase from 2.75% of
total payments to 3.32% of total payments. However, since no academic medical center could
realistically replace all its Medicaid patients with other insured patients, the true calculated
value lies somewhere between these two extremes.
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Weaknesses of this approach
Implicit in the use of opportunity cost models is the notion of a substitution of a
medically indigent patient for an insured patients and hence the assumption that physicians are
always fully occupied. This is certainly not always the case and thus the values generated in this
study cannot accurately or fully represent the reality of uncompensated care. In fact, one would
assume that a physician providing free services is not always fully occupied and that the true
value of his/her time is somewhat smaller than the values generated here. Hence, the
opportunity cost model and its results probably represents an overestimate of the true value.
Also, this model assumes that physician activities are completely accounted for
in billing data. If physicians donate time that isn’t represented in the financial database
(certainly the case to some extent), it will not be represented and could lead to an
underestimate of the true value.

Future directions
The calculated value of physician-derived uncompensated care for fiscal
year 2008 using this approach sets a baseline for future comparisons at the Yale Medical Group.
Subsequent or previous years can then be analyzed and compared. Given the importance of an
academic medical center such as Yale to the provision of such care, it is important to monitor
these activities using a model that reflects the most accurate values possible. Future modeling
would have to take into account several possible confounders. It is possible for instance, that
future adult patients might benefit from new government-sponsored programs. In such a
situation, calculated uncompensated care would be presumed to fall without affecting the
provision of care to the larger community. Thus, any changes in patient insurance levels would
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have to be controlled for over time. Also, as average physician reimbursements for each billable
charge changes over time, so does the calculated opportunity cost. For instance, if a billed
charge frequently used by the uninsured is reimbursed at a much lower rate in a subsequent
year, calculated uncompensated care would fall without there being a true change in physician
activity (or much change in physician payments). Thus, it would be necessary to monitor
changes in reimbursement rates at the CPT code level (taking into account the weighted
contribution of each CPT code to bad debt and free care categories) and compare these to the
changes in uncompensated care. If the changes in CPT reimbursement mirror the changes in
uncompensated care, then one could assume that no change in provision has actually taken
place.

Since the Yale Medical Group represents only a subset of the larger issue, this approach
could also be replicated in various other settings, other academic medical centers and private
practice groups. Extending this calculation using primary financial data would constitute a more
accurate assessment than current assumptions, write-offs and self-reported surveys.
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